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For the purposes of this paper, the term negligent murder
will be used to denote a homicide committed without specific
intent to kill or to cause great bodily harm, but a homicide pro-
duced by an act or acts which evidence on the part of the accused
a wanton and reckless disregard for human life.
In considering the problem of negligent murder, the student
of criminal law is confronted first with historical considerations
of the bases for criminal liability, and then with subsequent modi-
fications of those beginning principles.1  Murder early came to
be a homicide committed with malice aforethought.2 Because of
the unfortunate choice3 of this phrase "malice aforethought" to
distinguish the offense, it had subsequently to be twisted out
of its ordinary and logical sense into a peculiar, technical con-
notation.4
Since, however, murder did come to be distinguished from
other felonious homicides by defining it as a killing upon malice,
the malice was implied in certain instances.5 One such instance
is found in (b) of Stephen's analysis 6 and to it the purpose of
3 To quickly summarize this development so far as it is essential
to this paper, we may take part of a paragraph from Sayre's Mens Rea,
45 Harv. L. Rev. 974, at 1016-17. He says: "Under the dominating
influence of the canon law and the penitential books the underlying
objective of criminal justice gradually came to be the punishment of
evil-doing; as a result the mental factors necessary for criminality were
based upon a mind bent on evil-doing in the sense of moral wrong.
Our modern objective tends more and more in the direction, not of
awarding adequate punishment for moral wrong doing, but of protect-
ing social and public interests."
2 Stat. Book: 13 Rich. 2, s. 2, c. 1, 4 Hen. 8; Coke, Third Inst. (6th
ed. 1680) 47; Com. v. Green, 1 Ashm. (Pa. 1826) 289.
'A good discussion relating to this is found in 3 Stephen, Hist.
Crim. Law (18S3) 55.
4Kenney, Outlines of Crim. Law (15th ed. 1936) 153: "A modern
student may fairly regard the phrase 'malice aforethought' as now a
mere arbitrary symbol .... For the 'malice' may have in it nothing
really malicious; and need never be really 'aforethought' (except in
the sense that every desire must necessarily come before-though per-
haps only an instant before-the act which is desired)."
"Homicide is presumed to be murder, unless circumstances are
made to appear which extenuate the killing and render it either justi-
fiable or excusable .. ." 38 L.R.A. (N. S.) 1078.
"In reference to murder, 'malice... means any one of the follow-
ing states of mind, preceding or co-existing with the act or omission by
which death is caused:
"(a) An Intention to cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm
to, any person, whether such person is the person actually killed or not.
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this paper is to give some consideration. There Stephen por-
trays a state of mind which has been variously termed as "a
general malignity of heart", 7 "the heart regardless of social
duty and deliberately bent on mischief", 8 "a wicked, depraved,
and malignant heart", 9 etc. Present-day courts seem to favor
the phrase "depraved mind" 10 as best describing the attitude
They say that although the defendant had no intent to kill, and
though there was no express malice, his behavior was such as
"evinces a depraved mind" and the court will therefore imply
malice" and hold him guilty of murder.
Such reasoning is based upon the proposition that malice is
a necessary ingredient of murder, and that, since express malice
cannot be proved, the law must imply it or the culprit will go
unpunished.' 2 It is necessarily fallacious because malice in mur-
der is not required, the word is a work of art,'3 and the fact that
the law 'implies' it in a particular instance signifies merely that
under the facts of that case, it considers the conduct of the
"(b) Knowledge that the act which causes death will probably
cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm to, some person, whether
such person is the person actually killed or not, although such knowl-
edge is accompanied by indifference whether death or grievous bodily
harm is caused or not, or by a wish that it may not be caused.
"(c) An intent to commit any felony whatever.
"(d) An intent to oppose by force any officer of justice on his way
to, in, or returning from the execution of the duty of arresting, keeping
in custody, or imprisoning any person whom he is lawfully entitled to
arrest, keep in custody, or imprison, or the duty of keeping the peace,
or dispersing an unlawful assembly, provided that the offender has
notice that the person killed is such officer so employed . . ." 3 Stephen,
Hist. Crim. Law (1883) 22.
I East, Pleas of the Crown (1803) 269.
SFoster, Crown Law (3d ed. 1809) 262.
*Blackstone, Comm. (1897) 198.
"'Reed v. State, 225 Ala. 219, 142 So. 441 (1932); State v. Shepard,
171 Minn. 414, 214 N. W. 280 (1927); State v. Trott, 190 N. C. 674, 130
S. E. 627 (1925); Ex parte Flnney, 21 Okla. Crim. 103, 205 P. 197,(1922); Montgomery v. State, 178 Wis. 461, 190 N. W. 105 (1922).
"Malice in law. or implied malice, was sometimes simply a con-
clusion from the facts, and liable to be overcome by the proof of other
facts, and at other times it was an irresistible legal inference which
could not be rebutted." Darry v. People, 10 N. Y. (1854) 139.
"Malice... in its legal sense means a wrongful act done intention-
ally, without just cause or excuse." Bromage v. Prosser, 4 Barn. &
Cress 247 (1825) 255.
124 B1. Comm. (1897) 201; Perkins, Malice Aforethought, 43 Yale
L. J. 537 (1934) 550.
13 State v. Miller, 73 S. C. 277, 53 S. E. 426 (1906); Kenney, op. cit.
supra Note 4, at 134; 3 Stephen, Hist. Crim. Law 63; Wechsler and
Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 Col. L. Rev. 701 (1937)
707; 38 L. IL A. (N. S.) 1092-95.
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accused sufficiently blameworthy to merit a conviction of
murder."4
In determining the degree of blame to be attach.ed to any
conduct, the amount and degree of societal harm likely to result
is the controlling factor. 15 The requirement of intent to do
injury, though at first rendered lip service, was never applied.16
The practice of inferring17 and 'implying" s intent was a neces-
sary step away from its requirement since the courts found they
could not go beyond external manifestations of an accused's
thought processes.
There are cases in which the circumstances surrounding the
killing are such as would tend to negative any inference of an
"4 The reader is not to gather from this the idea that it is purely
arbitrary with the court whether an individual will be convicted of
murder, or a lesser offense. Whether conduct is to be characterized
as wanton and "evincing a depraved mind" is usually in the province
of the jury because it is considered in view of the surrounding circum-
stances. Only where the court feels that reasonable men could not
differ in Interpreting such conduct will the jury be precluded from a
chance to pass on it.
In the Report of the New York Law Revision Commission (1937)
at 640-41, are tabulated the kinds of acts which New York courts have
at various times considered as "evincing a depraved mind". They
include: shooting into a highway after dark, striking with a door bar,
stabbing, repeated beatings with fists, striking with an axe, throwing
an iron pot, shooting into a hcuse where people were, speeding on a
street where children were playing, etc.
1 "Again the dangerousness of the act rather than the killer's intent
or state of mind in a specific case was the controlling consideration."
Report of the N. Y. Law Rev. Comm. (1937) 539.
" Murder at common law embraces cases where no intent to kill
existed. 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1061, fn. 20. See also Com. v. Drum, 58
Pa. 9 (1868) and infra notes 17 and 18. See. (b) of Stephen's analysis,
supra note 6, shows that knowledge that an act will probably cause
death Is enough in murder.
"As where intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly
instrumentality or the administration of severe wounding in an obvi-
ously dangerous manner. An example of the latter is found in the old
case, referred to in Kelyng 64 (1666), where a mother punished her
child by brutally stamping on its belly, thus causing the child's death.
She was convicted of murder and executed. See also Rex v. Grey,
Kelyng 64 (1666); People v. 'Wolf, 95 Mich. 625, 55 N. W. 357 (1893);
State v. Douglas, 28 W. Va. 297 (1886); State v. Kellison, 56 W. Va.
690, 47 S. E. 166 (1904).
Is Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass. 1850) 295; Lewis v. State, 96
Ala. 6, 11 So. 259 (1892); Stovall v. State, 106 Ga. 443, 32 S. E. 586(1899).
"An Intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm will be implied as a
matter of law, and without inquiry into actual intent, on the principle
that a man is presumed to have intended the natural and probable con-
sequences of his voluntary acts." Clark and Marshall, Law of Crimes
(3rd ed. 1927) 291.
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intent on the part of the accused to cause death or serious injury,
yet the courts will hold him guilty of murder.19 Such a result is
possible only when a purely objective standard is applied in
gauging the actor's conduct. By measuring with an objective
yardstick, the courts determine the societal harm likely to result
from such conduct. If it were such as commonly entails a high
probability of death, the courts conclude that it is so far below
the standard which can be reasonably expected of a man of
ordinary prudence and good-will that it must not be permitted to
continue.
It will be seen that this is going a greater length than
Stephen intended to go in his second situation.20 His standard
on its face is subjective and would seem to necessitate a degree of
willfulness, or at least a willingness to cause death, which need
not actually be present. However, in applying his standard
Stephen would very likely have done just as the courts did, by
saying that if the conduct involved commonly known danger,
the accused would be charged with knowledge of its dangerous
tendencies. 21
1 In the case of Com. v. Chance, 172 Mass. 245, 54 N. E. 551 (1899),
in which the court affirmed a conviction of murder, we find Holmes,
C. J., saying: "If it had been necessary, the jury properly might have
been instructed that it is possible to commit murder without any actual
intent to kill or to do grievous bodily harm, and that, reduced to its
lowest terms, "malice" in murder, means knowledge of such circum-
stances that according to common experience there is a plain and strong
likelihood that death will follow the contemplated act, coupled perhaps
with an implied negation of any excuse or justification." (IHere fol-
lowed the quotation "The criterion in such cases is to examine whether
common social duty would, under the circumstances, have suggested a
more circumspect conduct." I East, P. C. (1803) 262).
Wechsler and Michael, op. cit. supra note 13, at 721 cite the
Chance case in support of theiy statement that "awareness of the risk
is unnecessary . . . in murder".
In Com. v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165 (1884) 178, Holmes further
expresses his belief that the common law applied an external standard
in murder: "The very meaning of the fiction of implied malice in such
cases at common law was, that a man might have to answer with his
life for consequences which he neither intended nor foresaw. To say
that he was presumed to have intended them is merely to adopt another
fiction, and to disguise the truth. The truth was, that his failure or
inability to predict them was immaterial if, under the circumstances
known to him, the court or jury, as the case might be, thought them
obvious."
2OHe says: "Death caused unintentionally is murder if the unlaw-
ful act or omission by which death is caused is known to the offender
to be eminently dangerous to life ... " (Italics supplied.) 3 Stephen,
op. cit. supra note 6.
"In Reg. v. Serne, Judge Stephen says: "... it would be reason-
able to say that any act known to be dangerous to life, and likely In
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The difficulty of determining how far the courts go in apply-
ing the objective standard, disregarding subjective considera-
tions, is very great because those cases in which a subjective
standard is applied are either within (d) of Stephen's analysis
or they are manslaughter decisions. There are decisions sup-
porting Holmes' view, however, and a close consideration of a
few of them becomes pertinent at this time.
In the case of WViey v. State,22 three officers going to the
scene of a robbery became suspicious of the occupants of a car
ahead of them and fired at the tires to halt them. The driver's
wife was struck by a bullet and killed, and the officer who fired
the shot was convicted of murder in the second degree. The
court, though saying that "Mlurder is the unlawful killing of a
human being with malice aforethought, ' 23 quoted Wharton 2 4
and Bishop25 as expressing the rule applicable to this situation.
The court concluded that: "The means used by appellants to
effect their purpose of stopping the Bates car were of the most
violent and threatening kind, so dangerous and lethal in fact, as
to cause the death of MNs. Bates."2
26
A further illustration of the externality of the standard
applied by the courts will be found in Banks v. State.2- There
itself to cause death done for the purpose of committing a felony which
caused death, should be murder." 16 Cox, C. C. 311 (1887). Since in
that case Stephen gave no consideration to whether the accused actually
realized the danger to life which his act involved, it would seem to be
a perfectly logical conclusion that he would have been equally objective
in judging conduct in which no felony was involved, other than the
death which it produced.
219 Ariz. 346, 170 P. 869 (1918).
2Id. at 873.
21 "Malice in law does not necessarily mean hate, ill will or malev-
olence but consists in any unlawful act wilfully done without just
excuse or legal occasion to the injury of another person . . . Evil
Intent is legal malice; so, also, is gross and culpable negligence where-
by another suffers injury." (Italics supplied.) 1 Crim. Law (11th ed.
1912) see. 146.
"If an act is unlawful or is such as duty does not demand, and
of a tendency directly dangerous to life, the destruction of life by it
however unintended, will be murder." 2 Crim. Law (9th ed. 1923)
sec. 689.
619 Ariz. 346, 170 P. 869 (1918), 873.
In the somewhat similar case of Davis v. State, 106 Tex. Cr. R.
300, 292 S. W. 220 (1927), an officer fired on a car which failed to halt
at his demand. The court affirmed a conviction of murder returned
under the charge that "if any person purposely and intentionally fire a
pistol at an automobile, knowing at the time that persons are occupants
therein, and thereby kill any of such occupants, such offense would be
murder, though the person firing had no specific intention to kill."
"85 Tex. Cr. R. 165, 211 S. W. 217 (1919).
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the defendant, one of a group of negroes who were walking along
a road, fired into a passing freight train, thereby killing a brake-
man. Conviction of murder was affirmed, the court observing
that "One who deliberately uses a deadly weapon in such reck-
less manner as to evince a heart regardless of social duty and
fatally bent on mischief, as is shown by firing into a moving rail-
road train upon which human beings necessarialy are, cannot
shield himself from the consequences of his acts by disclaiming
malice.' '28
Then there is a group of cases in which reckless and intoxi-
cated drivers of automobiles were convicted of murder for deaths
which they caused. 29 One of the strongest of these is State v.
Trott,30 in which the defendant while intoxicated ordered his
companion, also intoxicated, to "get on the wheel and get away"
in order to avoid arrest. This person thereafter ran the car on
one of the main streets of the city, after dark, at a rate of 50 or
60 miles per hour, wrecking another car and killing an occupant
thereof. In affirming a conviction of murder in the second
degree, the court said: "Malice does not necessarily mean an
actual intent to take human life. It may be inferrential or
implied, instead of positive, as when an act which imports danger
to another is done so recklessly or wantonly as to manifest
depravity of mind and disregard of human life. ' 31
2In a Note (1937), 25 Ky. L. J. 180, Banks v. State is cited as
indicative of the tendency of the courts to look to the consequences of
the act rather than to the intent which prompted it.
An oft-cited early American case in point is State v. Smith, 2
Strob. (S. C. 1847) 77, 47 Am. Dec. 589, in which the defendant was con-
victed of murder. He had shot at a negro riding along the road,
apparently for the sole purpose of causing his horse to become fright-
ened and throw him, but the bullet killed the negro's companion. The
court applied a wholly objective standard by saying: "If the act which
produced the death be attended with such circumstances as are the
ordinary symptoms of a wicked, depraved, and malignant spirit, the law
from these circumstances will apply malice, without reference to what
was passing in the prisoner's mind at the time he committed the act."
"9Reed v. State, 225 Ala. 219, 142 So. 441 (1932); Hyde v. State,
230 Ala. 243. 160 So. 237 (1935); State v. Weltz, 155 Minn. 143, 193
N. W. 42 (1923); State v. Shepard, 171 Minn. 414, 214 N. W. 280(1927); State v. Trott, 190 N. C. 674, 130 S. E. 627 (1925); Ware v.
State, 47 Okla. Crim. 434, 288 P. 374 (1930); Cockrell v. State, - Tex.
Cr. R. -, 117 S. W. (2nd) 1105 (1938).
- 190 N. C. 674, 130 S. E. 627 (1925).
"Id. at 629.
The recent case of Cockrell v. State, - Tex. Cr. R. -, 117 S. W.
(2nd) 1105 (1938) gives full support to the view of this decision. In
that case the defendant was driving while drunk at the rate of 60 miles
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That the view expressed in these decisions is not necessarily
peculiar to modern courts may be gathered from the case of Rex
v. Halloway.32 A boy had trespassed into a park to steal wood.
The parkkeeper found the boy, beat b.im, then tied him to a
horse's tail, whereupon the horse ran away, dragging th.e boy
and killing him. It was adjudged to be murder, the law imply-
ing malice aforethought. In this case, at a time when mens rea
was considered an essential factor in criminal liability, the court
applied an objective standard to the prisoner's conduct and
decided that it warranted a conviction of murder.
The case of Mayes v. People33 deserves comment. There the
defendant, in an angry and excited state of mind threw a beer
mug at his wife. It broke a lamp she was carrying, thereby caus-
ing her to be burned to death. He was convicted of murder, the
court stating that it was immaterial whether the defendant
intended the mug to strike his wife, "or whether he had any
specific intent, but acted solely from general malicious reckless-
ness disregarding any and all consequences". Because of such
a disregard, evidenced only by his outward conduct, the accused
was held guilty of murder.
By way of summary we may say that the law has long
punished certain negligent homicides as murder. In so doing,
it found the element of malice aforethought missing and resorted
to a fiction, namely, "implied malice". Far from being an evil
state of mind imposing moral guilt, "implied malice" was a sub-
stitute for such a state of mind. Such a fiction, if ever useful,
no longer has anything to commend it and it should be discarded.
The same may be said of "depraved mind" and "heart regard-
less of social duty". Unless criminality in murder is wholly sub-
jective, such phrases as applied to negligent murders can but be
misleading. The application of an objective standard to defend-
ant's conduct, without regard to what might have been the state
of his mind at the time, affords the maximum protection to
societal interests.
per hour and killed two pedestrians on the side of the highway. He
was found guilty of murder with "malice", the court citing and quoting
from State v. Trott, supra, and quoting also from Banks v. State, 85
Tex. Cr. R. 165, 211 S. W. 217 (1919), cited supra note 27, that: "The
intentional doing of any wrongful act in such manner and under such
circumstances as that the death of a human being may result therefrom
Is malice."
"2Cro. Car. 131 (1628).
-1106 Ii. 306 (1883).
L. J.-5
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It is submitted that a respectable body of authority is con-
tained in the cases herein referred to, and that such authority
sustains the conclusion that the law views objectively the
behavior of the individual. *Whenever a person's conduct is
such that according to common experience there is a strong and
obvious likelihood that death will result, if death is thereby
caused, it will be murder. This will be true even though the per-
son responsible intended no harm, expected no harm, and in fact
was totally unaware of the probability of bharm.
For those who would desire to cling to the old canon law con-
cept of criminal punishment only for an evil mind concurring
with a socially reprehensible act, we refer them to some of the
literature that is being written today to a great degree refuting
the idea that capital punishment and long-term prison sentences
are meted out for punishnent as such at all. Books have been
written and are being written suggesting that no individual is a
criminal in his own right.
In case one thinks this a too radical departure, there is
Stephen writing in 1883 saying: "As far as wickedness goes it is
difficult to suggest any distinction worth taking between an in-
tention to inflict bodily injury and reckless indifference whether
it is inflicted or not. ' 34 For the purpose of determining that
such reckless indifference existed, the law can look only to the
outward behavior of the individual.
It is hoped that the objective standard will have a deterring
effect in reducing the number of risks to which heedless individ-
uals will subject members of society.3 5 In those cases where it
does not deter, as in those where threat of punishment does not
deter intentional doing of harm, the conduct is blameworthy and
a menace to society.3 6 It can no more be tolerated and permitted
'43 Stephen, op. cit. supra note 6 at 56.
I "Knowledge that punishment may follow behavior that inadver-
tently creates improper risk, supplies men with an additional motive
to take care, before acting, to use their faculties and draw upon their
experience in determining the potentialities of their contemplated acts."
Wechsler and Michael, op. cit. supra note 13 at 751.
"I "For it is to be remembered that the object of the law is to pre-
vent human life being endangered or taken; and that although it so far
considers blameworthiness in punishing as not to hold a man responsible
for consequences which no one, or only some exceptional specialist,
could have foreseen, still the reason for this limitation is simply to
make a rule which is not too hard for the average member of the com-
munity. As the purpose is to compel men to abstain from dangerous
conduct, and not merely to restrain them from evil inclinations, the
NOTES
to continue by reason of the purity of purpose of the person
responsible than it can be when he is a professed enemy of all
mankind.
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law requires them at their peril to know the teachings of common
experience ... " Holmes, The Common Law, (1881) 56-57.
